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Abstract 
There is as yet little consensus in the literature as to the underlying 
drivers of electoral violence. This article identifies a key mechanism 
explaining the use of electoral intimidation, a form of violence, in de- 
mocratizing regimes. Within this context, we argue that the use of 
electoral intimidation against the opposition is most likely to be ob- 
served when a country moving to democracy has not yet experienced 
an electoral turnover. Building on previous theoretical and empiri- 
cal findings, we provide evidence supporting the idea that alternation 
in power serves as an effective tool to decrease the tensions between 
electoral winners and losers. Furthermore, we show that alternation 
in power is conditional on the performance of electoral management 
bodies. Based on a sample of 331 elections in 53 countries that have 
inaugurated multiparty competition since 1989, we find strong and 
robust support for our theoretical claims. Firstly, we show how al- 
ternation in power is determined by the degree of autonomy electoral 
management body adopted as part of the political opening process. 
Secondly, we provide evidence that electoral turnover depresses the 
use of electoral violence after controlling for relevant variables and 
correcting for selection issues. 
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Introduction 
 
Elections are generally recognized as a peaceful mean of resolving social dif- 
ferences, yet violence often besets electoral processes, even in democracies. A 
burgeoning literature on electoral conflict has identified this as a distinct form 
of political violence (Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013; Birch & Muchlinski, 2017b; 
Collier  &  Vicente,  2014;  Daxecker,  2012;  Fjelde  &  Ho¨glund,  2016;  Taylor, 
Pevehouse & Straus, 2017). In this article, we focus on incumbent-instigated 
intimidation, the most common type of electoral violence worldwide (Birch & 
Muchlinski, 2017a). Our aim is to understand the political and institutional 
drivers of this form of violence in democratizing regimes1 and, specifically, 
how intimidation is related to the consolidation of democratic practices. 
State-initiated electoral intimidation has been analyzed in a number of re- 
cent studies that view this form of electoral violence as being the result of 
the socio-demographic structure of society and the vulnerability of under- 
privileged  groups  to  coercion  (Dercon  &  Gutie´rrez-Romero,  2012;  Gonza- 
les Ocantos et al., 2016), the dynamics of patronage and coercive clientelism 
(Mares & Young, 2016), or the competitive context in which elections are 
held (Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014; Wilkinson, 2006). 
Elections in democratizing regimes have been found to be more vulnerable 
to violence than those held in either fully democratic or fully authoritar- 
ian states (Klaus & Mitchell, 2015; Mochtak, 2016). There are several pos- 
sible reasons for this:  the fragility of democratic institutions in countries 
1Our unit of analysis is countries which experience a spell of institutional change to- 
wards democracy by allowing a certain level of political competition, but which do not 
necessarily end up becoming fully democratic regimes. 
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moving towards democracy means that democratic governance may not be 
entirely accepted by all actors in the electoral arena as the only game in 
town. Moreover, the democratization period is one that is typically at high 
risk of political violence as it can be used by some domestic actors to op- 
portunistically raise their demands (Snyder, 2000). Finally, democratizing 
regimes have typically experienced a reduction in the forms of heavy state 
repression that characterizes authoritarian states, however these means of se- 
curing peace may not yet have been replaced by fully-functioning democratic 
mechanisms. The use of violence at election time is thus a distinct risk in 
the political regimes under study in this article. For these reasons, under- 
standing electoral intimidation in democratizing countries is of considerable 
importance. 
Since the 1970s, a large number of states have made transitions from uncon- 
tested authoritarianism to some form of contested political regime. While 
some countries have become full democracies, a large number of them have 
retained only some features of democracy (Levitsky & Way, 2010). A key 
element to observe this institutional variation involves electoral conduct and 
electoral outcomes (Schedler, 2013). In virtually all such contexts, the tra- 
jectory of democratic consolidation is one in which power-holders must learn 
to lose elections and adapt to extended periods in opposition. Indeed, alter- 
nation in power is for scholars a defining feature of democratic consolidation 
and institutionalization (Fearon, 2011; Przeworski, 2005). 
We argue that electoral turnover is the most important brake on electoral 
intimidation in the democratizing context, and that incumbent leaders are 
most likely to use intimidation where a norm of changing governments has 
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not yet been institutionalized. Specifically, we advance a two-step argument 
showing first that that the presence of impartial electoral management bodies 
(EMBs) is key to upholding the integrity of electoral processes in democra- 
tizing regimes. When EMBs exhibit genuine political autonomy, they pave 
the way for elections that enable alternation in power. The second step in 
the argument is to show that alternation in power engenders norms of peace- 
ful coexistence and dissuades incumbents from employing repressive electoral 
tactics for fear that they may be the victims of such practices at some point 
in the future. These conjectures are tested and confirmed on a global dataset 
of 53 states that transitioned to democratic electoral competition between 
1989 and 2014. 
The article makes several important contributions to the literature. It ex- 
tends our understanding of electoral violence to democratizing countries. By 
doing so, the article identifies institutional dynamics that hinder or promote 
electoral intimidation in the early stages of democracy. As such, this research 
also makes an important contribution to the literature on democratization, 
demonstrating how the consolidation of democratic institutions can serve to 
maintain electoral peace. In addition, the analysis conducted here helps to 
flesh out our growing understanding of how electoral management bodies 
operate to regulate democratic processes. 
 
 
The logic of EMBs 
 
As noted above, our argument has two components: We argue that in de- 
mocratizing regimes, leaders are frequently under pressure to delegate power 
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to independent electoral management bodies, and that such electoral man- 
agement bodies in turn facilitate alternation in power. A number of scholars 
have recognized that EMBs are key players in ensuring electoral integrity 
and peaceful polls (van Ham & Lindberg, 2015; Norris, 2014; Orji, 2017), 
yet there has been limited discussion of how they achieve this. In the 1990s, 
there was a strong emphasis on formal EMB independence, and many of the 
electoral management infrastructures of new democracies are based on this 
model, which contrasts with the government administration of elections that 
is most common in long-established democracies (Lo´pez-Pintor, 2000).  The 
logic of adopting an independent EMB is that the actor who makes this de- 
cision also makes a credible commitment to hold truly competitive elections. 
Once autocratic regimes decide to open up political competition, the adop- 
tion of an impartial electoral management body is an institutional device 
that signals the strength of this commitment, as well as being a mechanism 
to ensure the legitimacy of the electoral outcome (North, 1993; Svolik, 2013). 
In this regard, the impartiality of the EMB is what determines the credi- 
bility of holding competitive elections. A number of studies, however, have 
demonstrated that the formal independence of electoral management bod- 
ies is far less important than their de facto autonomy (Birch, 2011; Birch & 
Van Ham, 2017; Hartlyn, McCoy & Mustillo, 2008; Opitz, Fjelde & Ho¨glund, 
2013). De facto autonomy is a matter of impartiality and freedom from po- 
litical interference. Regardless of their formal design, EMBs that achieve 
de facto autonomy play a crucial role in ensuring that elections have cred- 
ibility and integrity, and the that electoral process is peaceful. Though not 
all forms of electoral misconduct involve technical electoral procedures, pop- 
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ular confidence in the conduct of elections is closely tied to perceptions of 
electoral authority independence (Bowler et al., 2015; Kerr, 2013; McAllister 
& White, 2011; Norris, 2014). And the belief that an election may be or has 
been fraudulent is a common trigger for outbursts of anger and violence 
(Ho¨glund, 2009; Sisk, 2012). 
The literature that specifically focuses on EMBs and electoral violence is 
largely limited to practitioner reports and a handful of case studies, mostly 
of Sub-Saharan African countries (Kammerud, 2011; Orji, 2017). These anal- 
yses suggest that inclusive and well-functioning electoral management bodies 
have an important role to play in mitigating and deterring violent elections 
by documenting intimidation and imposing sanctions, thus significantly rais- 
ing the cost of violent intimidation for incumbents. The mechanisms by 
which this happens are, however, not clear. We argue that de facto EMB 
autonomy paves the way for electoral turnovers, which are in turn associated 
with reduced levels of intimidation. Our argument builds on the expectation 
that when incumbents lock in de facto EMB autonomy in the post-transition 
period, this then facilitates alternation in power which acts as a deterrent for 
incumbents to engage in electoral intimidation. 
 
 
Alternation in power as a mechanism to solve 
conflict 
Alternation in power is a defining feature of our stylized understanding of 
democracy, as the ability of electorates to throw the rascals out is the princi- 
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pal mechanism of popular accountability in democratic regimes (Przeworski, 
Stokes & Manin, 1999). But though democratic thinking has long viewed al- 
ternation in power in terms of accountability, we argue that it also plays an 
additional important role in the democratic process: it provides actors with 
an incentive to refrain from engaging in violent repression and abuse when 
they are in power. Once dislodged from power, current incumbents may well 
face a number of years in the political wilderness, and they have an incentive 
to ensure that their periods out of power are not wracked with peril. If they 
mistreat their opponents while in power, they have every reason to believe 
that they may suffer the same fate at a future date if an electoral defeat is 
observed. The expectation of alternation should thus in theory be a powerful 
means of curbing violent intimidation (Przeworski, 2011). 
To happen, alternation in power requires a number of conditions to be met. 
Incumbents need to anticipate that conceding electoral defeat will not result 
in any serious damage to them or to their followers (Przeworski, 2005). If that 
is not the case, incumbents may, indeed, seek to rig elections including the 
use of harassment (Ruiz-Rufino, 2018). Likewise, opposition forces need to 
have a high degree of certainty that they will be able to win election at some 
later point in time, even if the incumbent implements policies that may not 
be beneficial to the opposition’s interests during the current electoral period. 
If these conditions hold, electoral losers will be prepared to admit defeat, and 
alternation in power is likely to be observed. Moreover, once alternation in 
power occurs, it becomes a habit (Przeworski, 2015; Cho & Logan, 2014). 
Furthermore, we conceive alternation in power as a post-transition endoge- 
nous process which depends on political actors’ expectations given the in- 
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stitutional rules under which they are governed. In democratizing regimes, 
actors often have limited experience on which to build expectations about 
the future behavior of their political rivals. Under these circumstances, they 
benefit from institutions that serve as coordination devices to ensure a level 
playing field for electoral competition. At the same time, collective benefit 
does not ensure that such institutions will emerge, as incumbents have incen- 
tives to maintain political control over the institutions that allocate power 
in order to extend their tenure. However, following a democratic opening 
in which competition increases, the strategic incentives of incumbents often 
change. Not only do they wish to retain power, they also desire to do so free 
from the fear of a violent ouster by opposition forces. Fearon (2011) shows 
formally how leaders have incentives credibly to commit to upholding demo- 
cratic institutions in order to stave off the threat of rebellion and a disorderly 
exit from power. The use of an autonomous electoral management body can 
play this role of credible commitment. 
Figure 1 illustrates our theoretical logic where impartial EMBs facilitate 
alternation in power, which creates incentives for decreased levels of electoral 
intimidation. 
Figure 1. Summary of theoretical argument. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Consequence 
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The following hypotheses summarize our discussion so far: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Alternation in power serves to quell electoral violence 
in countries that have inaugurated multiparty competition. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): De facto EMB autonomy plays a major role in guar- 
anteeing alternation in power. 
These hypotheses might make the reader consider whether the causal logic 
considered here is one that is specific to state-initiated intimidation. Though 
the comparative evidence suggests that state actors (and their proxies) are 
responsible for most electoral violence (Straus & Taylor, 2012), opposition 
and insurgent groups do also use violent strategies in electoral contexts (Bur- 
chard, 2015; Collier & Vicente, 2014; Matanock & Staniland, 2018), and they 
may also have an incentive to refrain from engaging in electoral violence if 
they think that power may at some point in the future be available to them 
through electoral means. However, there are at least two reasons to be- 
lieve that the causal process considered here pertains mainly to intimidation 
initiated by the state. First, state actors in democratizing regimes are by 
definition those that have, at least, some a priori commitment to upholding 
democratic standards; otherwise the states they run would not be included 
in our study. The same may not necessarily be true of all minor opposition 
parties and insurgent groups that undertake violence at election time; they 
may have no commitment to democracy and no expectation of achieving 
power through democratic means. The logic of alternation in power would 
thus not apply to them, even if it applied to the primary opposition party 
in the country in question. Second, a country’s main opposition party is less 
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likely than the incumbent to employ intimidation as an electoral strategy 
due to the potential for government punishment and reprisals, and also due 
to the more limited means at their disposal to effect credible intimidation. 
If the anticipation of assuming power had any impact on their strategy, it 
would thus be dampened by their lower propensity to resort to intimidation 
overall. 
One might also question whether the autonomy of EMBs was genuinely ex- 
ogenous to alternation in power. After all, both EMB autonomy and al- 
ternation may be a function of the willingness of the incumbent party at 
the time of political liberalization to allow genuine competition. We assume 
that EMB autonomy is exogenous to alternation in power for two reasons. 
Firstly, making EMBs fully autonomous may be explained by international 
pressures similar to, for example, the expectation that states will invite elec- 
toral monitors (Hyde, 2011). Indeed, there is some literature indicating how 
international organizations sponsored the creation of autonomous EMBs in 
countries moving towards democracy (Lo´pez-Pintor, 2000).  Secondly, we as- 
sume that incumbents do not necessarily have full information about the 
true level of support for their government. Leaders of democratizing regimes 
typically delegate power to autonomous EMBs in order to bolster their own 
legitimacy (Magaloni 2006), which may be necessary in order to avert popu- 
lar unrest (Chernykh & Svolik, 2015). Often they do so in the belief that an 
impartial EMB will not seriously impair their ability to win elections, due to 
misperceptions of their true popularity (Hartlyn, McCoy & Mustillo, 2008; 
Slater & Wong, 2013). This phenomenon, termed by Slater & Wong (2013) 
“conceding to thrive” occurs where authoritarian rulers embrace democrati- 
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zation in the hopes of benefitting from it. The literature on democratization 
is rich in cases of democratizing authoritarian elites misperceiving their likely 
long-term electoral prospects under open electoral competition and therefore 
allowing genuine competition overseen by an autonomous EMB only to fail 
before long - if not always immediately - at the polls. In addition to the east 
Asian cases of Taiwan, South Korea and Indonesia analyzed by Slater and 
Wong, Mexico and Ghana (discussed at some length below) are perhaps the 
best examples of this phenomenon; other examples include Bulgaria (Birch 
et al., 2002) and Kyrgyzstan (Jones-Loung, 2000). One of the unintended 
consequences of delegation to an autonomous electoral authority is thus that 
alternation in power takes former authoritarian leaders unawares. And once 
EMB autonomy is locked in, it may be difficult for a nascent democracy to 
move away from this institution, due to the effect of path dependence. 
Given the importance of electoral management autonomy to international 
observers and the international community more generally, the credibility of 
a competitive regime is likely to depend to a large extent on how genuinely 
independent its EMB is, and efforts to subordinate the electoral management 
body to political control may well lead to high international legitimacy costs 
(Birch, 2011). 
A second possible objection to this argument is that of pacted transitions or 
other cases where packages of electorally-relevant political reforms are intro- 
duced at the time of transition. Pacts and packages of this type typically 
include provisions for autonomous EMBs together with reforms to the po- 
lice, the judiciary and the electoral system that simultaneously increase the 
likelihood of subsequent alternation in power and reduce the chances of vi- 
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olent elections. In such cases, it might be argued that political will and a 
genuine commitment to democratize are the principal drivers of change, and 
that EMB autonomy and alternation in power have little if any independent 
causal efficacy. However, though the initial impetus to change may be a pro- 
democratic commitment, the history of democratic transitions demonstrates 
that they are often derailed down the road as commitment wanes. All the 
countries in our dataset experienced this original impetus to democratize on 
the part of leaders, whereas only some managed successfully to transition to 
consolidated democracy. Our argument is that genuine EMB autonomy locks 
this commitment in place long enough to enable alternation in power, and 
that alternation in turn dampens actor appetite to employ coercive electoral 
strategies.2 
 
Illustrative case studies 
 
We discuss the cases of Mexico and Ghana to further illustrate our theoretical 
argument. These two cases provide examples of the ways in which electoral 
management bodies can foster alternation in power, and how alternation in 
power can in turn provide a strong disincentive to the use of intimidation as 
an electoral tactic. 
2Our data shows that adopting a relatively autonomous EMB was a decision mostly 
made simultaneously with opening up political competition. Only 18 countries in our 
sample experienced some change in the level of autonomy of EMB and in those cases, 
alternation in power was observed in 51% of cases (62).The level of EMB autonomy re- 
mained stable over time in 35 countries where 200 elections occurred; in this scenario, 
alternation in power was also observed in 51% of the cases (102). Finally, 16 countries in 
our dataset experienced alternation in power in the first competitive election when they 
also used an autonomous EMB. 
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Mexico 
 
The political changes that led Mexico to adopt a genuinely independent elec- 
toral authority are well-documented. The ruling Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) maintained its hegemonic position in Mexican politics for 67 
years through a combination of tactics, including moderate amounts of elec- 
toral fraud. However, the main basis of the party’s support was an extensive 
system of electoral clientelism which was particularly strong in rural areas. 
Over time, economic development and social change eroded the PRIs clien- 
telist support base; at the same time, there was less pork to distribute to 
voters due to the government’s decision to adopt neoliberal economic  policies 
following the 1982 debt crisis. During the 1980s, the party therefore relied in- 
creasingly a combination of electoral fraud and intimidation to win elections 
(Levitsky & Way, 2010; Simpser, 2012). The level of abuse committed by 
the PRI in the 1988 elections and the widespread perception that challenger 
Cuauhte´moc Ca´rdenas had been robbed of victory sparked a protracted se- 
ries of post-electoral demonstrations which eventually resulted in electoral 
reforms (Eisenstadt, 2004). 
The use of intimidatory tactics had clearly cost the PRI dear in terms of 
legitimacy and popular support. At this point, key PRI leaders decided they 
would undoubtedly be better off in the long run tying their hands by del- 
egating the administration of elections to an independent authority - the 
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). This act of credible commitment simulta- 
neously restored confidence in electoral procedures and also gave the party 
a legitimacy boost (Magaloni, 2006). Though the PRI lost the presidency 
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in 2000, it had installed a system of electoral governance that was robust 
enough to prevent political domination by Mexico’s new leaders. This meant 
that the PRI was able to continue competing electorally unhindered, and 
in time it returned to power, ushering in a period of alternation in power 
that has lasted nearly two decades. During this time, electoral intimidation 
has declined considerably. After the IFE became operational in the mid- 
1994, the level of electoral intimidation shifted from “...sporadic instances 
of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents...” 
to “...no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its 
agents”.3 The Federal Election Court (TRIFE), the IFE’s sister EMB, has 
considerable powers to punish electoral wrong-doing, such that all parties are 
aware that if they want to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of the people, 
they need to play by the formal electoral rules (Nohlen, 2005). Moreover, 
party-nominated members of the IFE are effective in playing the role of party 
watchdog and monitoring potential wrong-doing by their rivals (Este´vez, Ma- 
gar & Rosas, 2008). Thus advent of truly independent electoral authorities 
and the possibility of alternation in power have turned intimidation from a 
vote-winner to a vote-loser. 
 
Ghana 
 
The electoral situation in contemporary Ghana is rather different from that 
in Mexico. Though electoral violence has yet to be entirely removed from the 
electoral process (Asunka et al., 2017; Oduro, 2012), its use is mainly by non- 
3Electoral intimidation is measured using the variable v2elintim ord from the Varieties 
of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset. 
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state actors against each other, and its incidence is considerably mitigated 
by electoral and political institutions that serve as models in the African 
context. Ghana was the first British colony in Africa to gain independence, 
in 1957. Following a coup in 1966, the nascent republic descended into an 
extended period of largely authoritarian rule, only to emerge in the early 
1990s via a transition to multiparty democracy. Between 1990 and 1996, 
the pathway to democracy, which included the delegation of electoral ad- 
ministration to relatively autonomous bodies, was motivated by the desire of 
authoritarian leader Jerry Rawlings to build international legitimacy, to end 
which electoral credibility played an essential role (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 
302-4). Since 1992, elections have been relatively free and fair, with alter- 
nations in power in 2000, 2008 and 2016. Ghana’s transition to multiparty 
politics was accompanied by the introduction of a system of electoral gov- 
ernance based on power-sharing and confidence building via dialogue fora 
involving electoral administrators together with political parties and civil 
society organizations. The Ghanaian approach to electoral management is 
thus as much about shaping norms as it is about imposing formal sanctions 
(Gyimah-Boadi, 1999). The Ghanaian electoral commission has a reputation 
for integrity (Collier & Vicente, 2012; Ruiz-Rufino, 2018). Odendaal notes 
that “The EC [Electoral Commission] has achieved a strong reputation in the 
region for relative efficiency, professionalism and conflict-resolution capacity. 
Its strategy of working with political actors in defusing potential flash points 
has been highly commended by international observers” (Odendaal, 2009: 
65). Oduro is somewhat more critical of the efficiency and professionalism of 
the Ghanaian EMB, but he concurs that it is impartial:  
17  
‘Several features of the election management body have contributed 
to its independence and expertise. In particular, security of tenure 
in its executive membership has liberated it from influence and 
promoted continuity in the commission’s administration” (Oduro, 
2012: 221). 
 
Additional semi-formal measures take the form of dialogue and confidence 
building institutions and practices which have been effective in defusing po- 
tentially conflictual situations and building trust between parties. The Elec- 
toral Commission maintains an Interparty Advisory Council which serves as 
a forum for inter-party dialogue and the establishment of norms of nonvio- 
lence (Gyimah-Boadi, 1999). The United Nations Development Programme 
has also been active in setting up institutions to mediate disputes (espe- 
cially at the time of the 2004 election, held in the wake of the assassination 
of a traditional leader which prompted unrest in the north of the country 
and facilitating dialogue between relevant political actors (Odendaal, 2009: 
65). The subsequent introduction of a National Peace Council together 
with Regional and District Peace Advisory Councils to undertake conflict 
mediation with all stake-holders further strengthened Ghana’s institutional 
capacity for conflict prevention (Odendaal, 2009: 66). More recently, a 
National Election Security Task-force (NEST) was established at the time 
of the 2016 election to coordinate violence prevention measures (EU, 2017: 
8). Thus in the context of a young state where formal institutions are not 
so well entrenched, semi-formal conflict mediation institutions play an 
important role in collaboration with the formal EMB in defusing tensions 
and building confidence at election time. 
The dual approach has been remarkably successful, and party alternation 
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in power has occurred regularly since 1992. The result has been a decline 
in electoral intimidation, especially since the late 1990s when the possibility 
of alternation became a reality. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) in- 
dicator of electoral intimidation indicates complete absence of intimidation 
from 2000 onwards.4 This is the year when the first alternation in power 
took place. In addition, Ghana has received generally favorable reports from 
international observers (EU, 2017, 2009). While violence and intimidation 
have not been eliminated entirely from the Ghanaian electoral arena, they 
have been largely controlled by bipartisan efforts to ensure peace. The main 
parties in Ghana both have strong incentives to maintain electoral credibility 
and to prevent violence from undermining confidence in elections, given that 
they both have real chances of assuming power following the vote. Genuine 
electoral completion has thus cemented partisan engagement with violence 
prevention institutions. 
The Mexican and Ghanaian examples serve to trace the links between EMB 
accountability, alternation in power and the reduction in electoral violence. 
In both cases, the advent of genuine electoral competition in the early-to- 
mid 1990s accompanied the introduction and institutionalization of impartial 
electoral authorities. Yet in neither case did electoral intimidation decline 
immediately. It was not until the late 1990s and early 2000s that violence 
witnessed marked drops, and this change in both cases coincided with al- 
ternation in power. These examples thus provide good illustrations of the 
way  in which EMB impartiality works to deter electoral intimidation,  via 
4The variable v2elintim ord  moves from 3 (a restrained level of intimidation) between 
1992 and 1996 to 4 (Complete absence of intimidation) from 2000 onwards. 
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alternation in power. 
 
 
Data and method 
 
To test our hypotheses, we use a dataset that contains 53 countries in the 
period between 1989 and 2014. Our dataset has 331 observations and the 
unit of analysis is the election-year.5 We select our units based on three 
criteria. First, we exclude states that were fully democratic between 1945 
and 1989 uninterruptedly.6 Second, we select countries that moved away from 
authoritarian political structures towards more open, competitive political 
systems. We capture this regime dynamic by choosing only countries that 
rank higher than 0 in the revised POLITY score.7 Our third criterion is that 
the state has remained above 0 in the polity2 score for at least two 
consecutive elections.8 There are three main justifications for this selection 
of cases. First, our study focuses on how alternation in power as a result of 
political competition may explain variations in levels of electoral intimidation 
by the incumbent; this excludes purely authoritarian regimes where electoral 
turnover is typically the result of internal coups or civil war (Gandhi, 2008). 
Secondly, by focusing on countries that have moved away from authoritarian 
regimes since 1989 we are creating a dataset where we control for the level 
5The dataset includes both parliamentary and presidential elections. 
6We consider a fully democratic country one that scores above 5 in the variable polity2 
in the POLITY IV dataset. 
7More concretely, we use the variable polity2 in the POLITY IV dataset and by choosing 
values greater than 0, we exclude extreme values -66, -77 and -88 which refer respectively 
to ”foreign interruptions”, ”interregnum” or ”transitions” (Marshall & Jaggers, 2015). 
8Given that executive tenure ranges between four and five years in most of the countries, 
countries entering our dataset must have experienced at least ten consecutive years of a 
competitive political spell using the POLITY criteria discussed above. 
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of political regime as well as recent transitions to democracy. Thirdly, by 
choosing countries with at least two electoral terms, we are maximizing the 
number of units with the level of political development we are interested in 
controlling for.9 
Our main hypothesis suggests that one should expect less electoral intimi- 
dation when the institutional conditions shaping electoral competition result 
in episodes of alternation in power. Our baseline model is thus: 
 
Intimidationct = β0 + δAlternationct + ωkControlsct + γc + τt + uct 
 
 
where Intimidation, the outcome variable, refers to the level of electoral in- 
timidation observed in country c in election year t. The main independent 
variable,Alternation, shows whether a country c, has previously experienced 
an alternation in power at election year t. Note that this variable actually 
refers to episodes of political turnover observed before the electoral year t as 
we further develop below. The model includes other relevant control vari- 
ables as well as regional, γ, and decadal, τ , fixed effects. Estimating this 
model in this form is problematic, however, as there may be observed and 
unobserved factors that simultaneously explained the outcome and the main 
variable of interest. In particular, alternation in power may be observed 
only if certain conditions are met. This is a type of selection problem which 
may result in biased estimators if not corrected.  To solve this endogeneity 
9The sample of countries that we are using in this analysis corresponds to most countries 
within the third-wave of democratization. However to make sure that our models capture 
the dynamics we are interested in, we extend the sample of countries and year in the 
robustness test section to include countries that moved away from authoritarian regimes 
since 1945; we also expand the dataset to cover the full range of anocracies as defined by 
POLITY IV. 
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problem, we use a switching regression model based on Heckman’s selection 
model and as developed by Quandt (1972) and Maddala (1986). These mod- 
els are also used in other studies of political regimes (Gandhi, 2008; Cheibub 
& Hays, 2017). As indicated by Guo & Fraser (2014), switching regressions 
in observational studies that suffer from sample selection can be used to es- 
timate treatment effects. In this sense, our model can be described by two 
equations, a regression equation: 
 
Intimidationct = β0 + δAlternationct + ωkControlsct + γc + τt + uct 
 
 
and a selection equation: 
 
 
Alternation∗
ct  
= θkzct + γc
∗ + τ
t
∗ + ect 
 
where the vector zct contains the factors explaining alternation in power. 
Note that if Alternation∗ > 0, then Alternation takes the value 1 and if 
Alternation∗ ≤ 0, the Alternation takes the value 0. The difference between 
switching regression and selection models like those used by Heckman is 
twofold. Firstly, the outcome variable, Intimidation, is observed for cases 
where countries have or have not experienced alternation in power. Secondly, 
the treatment enters the main regression equation in the following forms: 
 
Intimidationct = β0 + ωkControlsct + γc + τt + uct, 
when Alternation∗ ≤ 0 
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And: 
 
 
Intimidationct = β0 + δ(θzct + ict) + ωkControlsct + γc + τt + uct, 
when Alternation∗ > 0 
 
where the term ict includes the idiosyncratic error term, ect, as well as the 
fixed effects of the selection equation, γ
c
∗ and τ
t
∗. 
The outcome variable in our analysis is the level of government intimidation 
in country c in election t. This variable is operationalized using variable 
v2elintim from the Varieties of Democracy dataset. To ease the interpretation 
of the V-Dem variable, we have re-scaled the original values so that 100 
indicates a strong level of government repression and intimidation to electoral 
actors and 0 indicates elections where no intimidation towards the opposition 
was employed by the government.10 
10We use the original variable v2elintim in its interval form from the V-Dem Dataset 
v6.1 and v7.1.  The  operationalization  of  v2elintim  is  explained  in  the  accompany- ing 
documentation of the dataset and the original variable ranges from -3.68 to 4.05. The 
indicator answers to the question In this national election, were opposition candi- 
dates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harass- 
ment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents? Responses are coded along the 
following ordinal scale: “The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents 
was so strong that the entire period was quiet”; “There was systematic, frequent and vio- 
lent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during 
the election period”; “There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordi- 
nated harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents”; 
“There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government 
or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local 
branches of opposition groups” and “There was no harassment or intimidation of oppo- 
sition by the government or its agents during the election campaign period and polling 
day.” (Coppedge & et al., 2016).The following formula was used to transform the original 
variable v2elintim 
 
Intimidationct = 
 v2elintimc,t − v2elintimmax 
100
 
v2elintimmin − v2elintimmax 
where v2elintimc,t refers to the the level of electoral intimidation in country c in year t; and 
v2elintimmin and v2elintimmax refer to the minimum and maximum values of v2elintim 
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Alternation in power is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if country  c 
in year t has already experienced at least one alternation in power. This 
variable captures the history of the political regime in terms of electoral 
turnover. So, if country c has never experienced an alternation in power at 
the time of holding the elections, then the variable alternation takes the value 
0. However, if a country has experienced at least one episode of alternation in 
power any time before the current election, then alternation takes the value 
1. Note that such episode of alternation in power could have occurred at the 
latest in election t-1. This variable avoids problems of endogeneity with the 
outcome variable while capturing the mechanism that we are testing in this 
article. 
In the selection equation, alternation in power is determined by the level of 
de facto autonomy of the electoral management bodies11 and it enters the 
equation as the change in level of EMB autonomy compared to previous 
year.12 As we argued above, de facto EMB autonomy should be a relevant 
predictor of alternation in power.13 Following Cheibub (2007), presidential 
respectively. 
11The autonomy of the EMB is identified using variable v2elembaut ord from the V-Dem 
dataset. Since we are only interested in estimating the effect of autonomous EMBs on our 
model, we create a binary variable where 1 indicates that the EMB is almost or completely 
autonomous (categories 3 and 4) and 0 if these conditions are not observed (categories 0 
to 2). The distribution of the variable shows that 60% of the sample reveals full or high 
levels of autonomy. This distribution is consistent also with the literature indicating that 
democratizing countries from 1989 onwards were characterized by adopting fully or quasi- 
autonomous EMB institutions (Lo´pez-Pintor, 2000). 
12The operationalization of the variable is as follows: in the first observation, t0, EMB 
enters the dataset with its original value, however from t1 onwards, EMB reflects the level 
of autonomy of the electoral management body in period t compared to the previous 
observation. 
13EMB is treated as exogenous in our selection model. We have tested the exogeneity of 
EMB in various ways. First, we have run an auxiliary regression where EMB is regressed 
on our alternation in power variable along the same control variables used in the selection 
equation and a lag of the outcome variable. The coefficient of alternation in power is not 
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regimes are also relevant in explaining alternation in power as incumbents in 
this type of regimes are more likely to win than in parliamentary systems. 
Finally, the level of development is also important in explaining alternations 
in power. As Przeworski (2005) and Benhabib & Przeworski (2006) show, 
the probability of winning an election decreases as development increases.14 
Presidential regimes is a binary variable where 1 indicates that a country is 
presidential. Finally, development is captured by levels of GDP per capita 
as obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
The main regression equation includes several control variables. Competi- 
tion is binary variable that indicates whether the elections were competitive 
meaning by this that there is a certain level of uncertainty around the out- 
come of the election.15 Secondly, the main model also controls for the level 
of institutionalized constraints chief executives face when exercising their 
decision-making powers as such constraints may explain the willingness of 
the incumbent to engage in acts of intimidation.16 Finally all models include 
an autoregressive vector of the outcome variable to control for lag effects 
along with regional and decade fixed effects to account for unobserved fac- 
tors. Table 1 shows the main descriptive values of the relevant variables. 
 
Figure 2 describes the relationship between alternation in power and levels 
of electoral violence without considering any selection correction for EMB 
statistically significant at any of the accepted levels as Table A3 in the Online appendix 
shows. Secondly, we use IV analysis as shown below. 
14Alternation in power is operationalized using variables v2eltvrexn and v2eltvrig from 
the V-Dem Dataset. 
15The  variable  competitive  is  taken  from  Skaaning,  Gerring  &  Bartusevicˇius  (2015)  as 
collected by the V-Dem Dataset. 
16Executive constraints are measured using the variable xconst2 from the POLITY 
Dataset. 
25  
 
 
 
 
Table I. Summary statistics 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Outcome variable      
Intimidation 331 40.771 13.355 19.060 73.648 
Determinants of intimidation      
Alternation 331 0.646 0.478 0 1 
Competition 331 0.788 0.408 0 1 
Executive Constraints 316 5.939 1.205 3 7 
Determinants of alternation      
EMB 331 0.595 0.491 0 1 
Presidential 331 0.888 0.315 0 1 
GDP/cap 322 3,785.6
8 
4,970.15
8 
120.62 27,501.8
1 
 
autonomy. Graphically, it can be seen how, on average, levels of intimida- 
tion are lower - low values of the outcome variable - when countries have 
experienced alternation in power at the time of the election than when they 
have not. 
 
 
Results 
 
The main claim of this article is that levels of electoral intimidation by gov- 
ernment actors can be explained by how institutionalized democracy is. If 
a key component of democratic regimes is the selection of representatives 
using open, competitive and uncertain elections, then observing competing 
and rivaling platforms alternating in power is a sufficient condition to de- 
clare a regime democratic (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010) and when 
this mechanism is observed, levels of electoral intimidation should be low. 
We test this hypothesis in several steps. 
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Figure 2. Levels of intimidation and alternation in power 
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Table II shows a mean comparison between levels of intimidation in coun- 
tries that experienced alternation in power and countries that did not. In our 
sample, previous electoral turnover did not occur in 117 cases (35%) and in 
those cases the mean value of intimidation was 44.61. Previous alternations 
in power were, however, observed in 214 cases (65%) and the mean value of 
intimidation was 38.66, thus, indicating less intimidation of electoral actors 
by the government. The difference between these two values, 5.94, is statis- 
tically significant at 5%, indicating the relevance of the association between 
these two variables. 
 
When a regression model is run to estimate the linear effect of past alter- 
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Table II. Effect of alternation on intimidation 
 
 
Mean (SD) of outcome 
 
Countries with no alternation in power (n=117) 44.616 (1.182) 
Countries with alternation in power (n=214)  38.66 (0.903) 
Unadjusted mean difference(a) 5.94 (1.50)*** 
 
 
Uncorrected Regression-adjusted mean (SE) difference  0.23 (0.97) 
Corrected Regression-adjusted mean (SE) difference -6.77 (2.93)** 
 
Reported p-values in parentheses: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
(a) Independent t-test on mean differences 
 
nation on levels of intimidation controlling for other relevant covariates,17 
the coefficient is negative and not statistically significant.18 This coefficient 
reflects the bias in the estimation of the parameters as a consequence of the 
endogeneity of the model. The corrected unbiased estimation is provided in 
the last row of Table II and it indicates a negative and statistically signifi- 
cant result in line with the expectations of our hypothesis and with the trend 
shown in Figure 2. 
Table A2 in the Online appendix shows the full estimation of the corrected 
model. The table shows three models with different specifications.19 The 
validity of the estimation can be seen in the third panel of Table A2. First, 
17Our baseline model is estimated using OLS and panel-corrected standard errors. 
18The full estimation of this model can be found in table A1 in the Online appendix. 
19The model specifications depend on the type of fixed effects added. We use regional 
and decade fixed effects to control for unobserved entity or time invariant effects. Using 
regional rather than country fixed effects is justified given the small number of observa- 
tions in some countries. The regions used are Latin America (the reference category), 
Asia, South-East Asia, Africa and Europe. Likewise, given that some countries, specially 
presidential regimes, held several elections in a given year, year fixed effects are replaced 
by a binary variable that captures whether the election took place between 1989 and 1999 
or not. 
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the correlation of the errors - rho in the table - in the selection and regression 
equations is positive. A Chi-square testing ρ = 0 is also performed and, in 
all three cases, it is rejected, allowing us to conclude that the errors of the 
two equations are indeed correlated, which is a necessary condition for the 
application of a selection model. The inverse Mills ratio - lambda - is also 
positive and statistically significant, providing further evidence justifying the 
application of this treatment effect model. 
The selection equation also confirms the validity of the theoretical claims we 
made earlier. Importantly for the argument developed here, all three models 
show that having an autonomous electoral management body is positively 
associated with observing past episodes of alternation in power. These find- 
ings already provide a better understanding of the role an EMB may play in 
electoral competition (Hartlyn, McCoy & Mustillo, 2008; Hyde & Pallister, 
2015). Development is statistically significant although the size of the coeffi- 
cient is also small; finally, being a presidential regime does not seem to affect 
the probability of observing alternation in power.20 
Lastly, the regression equation shows the average treatment effect of alter- 
nation once the model is corrected for selection and after controlling for 
relevant variables. As the first panel in Table A2 shows, this effect ranges 
from -6.89 when a model excluding fixed effects is used to -6.77 when a full 
model specification is used. In all cases, the effect alternation has on moder- 
ating intimidation is statistically significant and Figure 3 shows the predicted 
value of the outcome variable depending on whether a country had or had not 
20The results hold if the variable EMB is used with the original five categories of the 
variable v2elembaut ord from the V-Dem Dataset. 
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experienced an alternation in power in a given election. As the graph shows, 
the level of electoral intimidation in countries with no history of alternation 
in power is 45.7, however if alternation in power has occurred, then, the level 
of electoral intimidation is 38.91. This difference is statistically significant at 
5%. 
Figure 3. Predicted violence and alternation in power 
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Robustness tests 
 
In order to test the robustness of our findings, we conduct several analyses 
using alternative sample, estimations, explanations, different data sources 
and different outcome variables.21 Our first group of robustness tests refers 
to the sample size and the selection of the unit of analysis. Table III be- low 
compares the coefficient for alternation used in the main analysis with a 
dataset that uses a time frame 1945 to 2015; a dataset that includes con- 
solidated democracies in the period 1945-2015 and, finally, a dataset that 
expands our initial definition of democratizing regimes to also cover anoc- 
racies as defined by POLITY IV.22 All the results maintain the negative 
direction of the relationship and they remain statistically significant.23 
 
A second robustness test refers to our estimation model. In our previous 
analysis, we justified how EMB autonomy is considered to be exogenous in 
our model. Our second robustness test, however, questions this assumption 
as one might, for example, argue that observing de-facto autonomous EMBs 
is the result of a bargaining process between the governing and opposition 
elites which may also affect the future functioning of the electoral manage- 
ment body.24  If this is the case, then our analysis would be biased as the 
21This section only shows the robustness tests on sample size, case selection and esti- 
mation model. Additional robustness tests are discussed in the Online appendix. 
22Anocracies are defined as those political regimes that range from -5 to 5 in the polity2 
score. 
23The coefficients are, however, smaller than those in the original model. This is con- 
sistent with our argument. The extended sample includes countries that consolidated 
democracy very quickly - Jamaica and the Dominican Republic have each experienced six 
alternations in power since 1962 - and following our theoretical logic, more alternation in 
power should be associated with less electoral violence. 
24Suppose also that observing an alternation in power and making an EMB autonomous 
could be simultaneous events. 
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Table III. Robustness tests - Samples 
 
 
Model Alternation p N 
 
Original sample 
 
-6.77 
 
0.021 
 
265 
Since 1945 -3.5 0.002 716 
Including consolidated democracies -3.68 0.007 994 
Including full range of anocracies -3.67 0.004 872 
 
selection equation would not be properly identified. To solve this problem we 
repeat our main analysis using an instrumental variable approach. Following 
Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2012), we create a new variable which indicates the 
proportion of past elections that were occurred under a de facto autonomous 
EMB in election t.25 Using this new variable as an instrument for EMB 
autonomy, we re-estimate the probit selection equation used in our models 
using a two-stage procedure26 to then recalculate the treatment taking into 
account the IV estimation. Figure 4 shows the values of the coefficients before 
and after using IV. If we assumed some level of endogeneity between EMB 
and electoral turnover, we would still observe a negative and significant effect 
on electoral intimidation.27 
 
 
25The indicator ranges from 0 for the first election to EMB 
n−1 
where 
L 
EMB refers 
to the total number of elections managed under a de facto autonomous EMB just before 
election t and n 1 is the number of previous elections in a given country observed in the 
dataset. 
26The instrument is significant in the first stage of the regression and the F statistics is 
210 which confirm its validity 
27The p-value of the ATE(IV) coefficient is p ≥ 0.075. 
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Figure 4. Effect of alternation in power using different estimations. 
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Conclusion 
 
This article examines the use of intimidatory behavior in democratizing 
regimes. The analysis presented here has identified a previously unexamined 
pathway linking electoral management body autonomy to electoral intimida- 
tion via alternation in power. The analysis is robust to a range of possible 
objections, and the mechanism it describes is clearly evident in the cases of 
Mexico and Ghana examined. 
If it is the case that de facto electoral authority independence is a key factor 
in shaping both alternation in power and electoral violence, this has consid- 
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erable implications for the scholarly study of electoral processes in democ- 
ratizing contexts as well as for electoral assistance. The study of electoral 
integrity has begun to probe the effects of electoral management bodies on a 
variety of electoral phenomena, but understanding of this institution lags be- 
hind that of electoral systems, party systems or executive type. The analysis 
presented in this article suggests that electoral management bodies play a 
major role in shaping electoral processes. Though the article provides exten- 
sive descriptive and empirical evidence that supports the assumption that the 
autonomy of EMBs is exogenous to observing alternation in power, further 
analysis is required to better understand the causal relationship between the 
functioning of EMBs and electoral turnover. In this regard, future research 
could carefully examine the factors that push rulers to adopt autonomous 
EMBs and the consequences of this move for their political survival. Finally, 
the findings of this article are also relevant for practitioners working on elec- 
toral assistance who are concerned with electoral violence. The promotion 
of autonomous electoral management bodies emerges as a straightforward 
policy recommendation. 
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Replication data 
The dataset and dofiles needed to replicate the empirical analysis in this arti- 
cle, along with the Online appendix, can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. 
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